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 A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future 
Or 
Yesterdays and Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan 
 




Afghanistan may be the only country in the world where during the last century kings and 
politicians have been made and undone by struggles relating to womens status. Recently, the situation 
of women under the Taliban rule has been center stage. The situation of women came to symbolize to 
Western military powers a justification of war in the name of freedom of women. But the situation of 
women in Afghanistan today is not only the result of the Talibans policies. There is a history over the 
centuries of womens subjugation. Even in more recent times the Mujahideens2  (1992-1996) record is 
worse than the Talibans. Thus, one must approach the analysis of women's situation in Afghanistan, not 
through the ideological formulation of before and after the Taliban, but within the larger historical 
context of Afghanistan. Only such a perspective can ensure that women will be seen as integral to the 
rebuilding of the Afghan nation. 
In this paper, through recounting the history of women in Afghanistan, I want to position 
women for the future through lessons learned from the past. The focus of this paper is on the importance 
of rural Afghanistan in the shaping of the nation and on womens status. Rural Afghanistan is the root of 
tribal powers that have frequently doomed Kabul-based modernization efforts. Social traditionalism and 
economic underdevelopment of rural Afghanistan have repeatedly contested the center (Kabul), thus a 
better understanding of tribal controlled areas is essential to empower women in these regions. For 
women in rural Afghanistan, control over their lives and gender roles is determined by patriarchal 
kinship arrangements. These kinship relationships are derived from the Quran and tribal traditions where 
men exercise unmitigated power over women. While Islam is deeply entrenched in the country, a 
hybridized compromise of Islamic and secular ideals of gender relations, along with economic 
reconstruction of rural Afghanistan will be proposed as a process towards enhancing womens status. 
I argue that today, Afghanistan's economic marginalization, social disorder, and political 
dislocation can be conceptualized as "deficiencies" that women can maneuver to their advantage. Under 
the current conditions women could redefine their roles in the family and community in ways that 
improve both their and the nation's lives. Although economic reconstruction is primary, this 
reconstruction can be connected to wider social change and to building political democracy in ways that 
include women on new terms. In other words, Afghanistans economic bankruptcy creates opportunities 
to renegotiate the division of labor along gender lines and to argue against the continued exclusion of 
women from the paid labor force. Afghanistans social development can only be ensured through 
democracy and the reduction of poverty, the success of both being assured through full participation of 
women, especially in rural Afghanistan.  
In this paper I trace the history of women in Afghanistan for three main reasons. One, to show 
that women in Afghanistan were not always oppressed by fundamentalism as occurred under the 
Mujahideen and the Taliban.3 Two, to show that womens issues were an integral part of national 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Womens Studies, San Diego State University. 
2 The Mujahideens, which translates to freedom fighters, supported by the USA, Iran, and Pakistan fought against 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
3 Henceforth, the Mujahideens and the Taliban will be referred to as Afghan fundamentalists. 
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 construction agendas even as early as the 1920s. Three, to highlight the power of tribal/community 
leaders in defining the role of women and in successfully resisting any modernization that would 
challenge their patriarchal authority. This paper chronicles Afghanistans political history to highlight 
the sporadic efforts made to empower women in an attempt to create a sense of nationhood. This is 
essential to explore because the political and powerful nature of tribal dictates in the Afghan 
countryside, and the oppositional ruling parties and elite are instrumental in determining the scope of 
womens lives. Women in Afghanistan are not an isolated institution; their fate is entwined with and 
determined by historical, political, social, economic and religious forces. In addition to a range of 
internal tensions, outside or international political forces have impacted Afghanistan in significant ways. 
Two critical epochs in Afghan history have shaped gender dynamics and affected women's status 
in Afghanistan. The first period took place during the reign of Amanullah in 1923 and included rapid 
reforms to improve womens lives and women's position in the family. The reforms met with 
widespread protest and contributed to the ultimate demise of Amanullahs reign. The second period 
occurred under the leadership of the communist-backed Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA). This leadership forced an agenda of social change to empower women that led to the ten-year 
war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the birth of the Mujahideen, and the decline of women's 
status. Despite the defeat of these reforms, the two eras provide evidence that Afghanistan has had a 
history of progressive efforts to provide women's rights and develop the basis for a more egalitarian 
society. At the same time, this historical review brings to light the significance of the rural/urban divide 
in Afghanistan. While Kabul has historically been the cosmopolitan center and will continue to lead the 
push for modernization in the future, any economic development must also include changes in the 
structure of power in rural regions. Such structural transformations are essential to the improvement of 
womens status in Afghanistan and can only happen when the countryside becomes an integral part of 
Afghanistans new plans for economic development. 
 
Brief Background 
Afghanistan is very rugged in its topography and various ethnic, religious, and tribal groups 
sparsely populate it. According to Magnus and Naby (1998) the population of Afghanistan is 
approximately 14 million. The largest ethnic groups are Pashtuns at 40 percent and the Tajiks at 20 
percent. The next largest groups are the Hazaras, Uzbeks and Aimaq. Both spatial and ethnic 
impenetrability has prevented Afghanistan from ever forming a consensual and coherent sense of 
nationalism. In addition, interference by western countries and countries bordering Afghanistan have 
contributed to the fragmentation of the Afghan polity. In many instances, tribal politics is still 
determined by ethnic loyalties to bordering states. Although there have been sporadic attempts to bring 
dissenting tribes together, at no point has the Afghan nation experienced a strong centralized state with a 
common legal system. (Moghadam, 1997) Instead, rival ethnic groups have had political ambitions to 
capture Kabul and, through well-armed tribal leaders (supported by external funds), created their own 
sovereignties. Ethnically based rivalries, combined with open and varied interpretations of Islam, have 
created fractious cultures. 
The impact on women has been especially harsh, since womens lives have often been used as 
the raw material with which to establish ethnic prominence. Tribal laws and sanctions have routinely 
taken precedence over Islamic and constitutional laws in deciding gender roles, especially through 
kinship hierarchies in the rural regions. Tribal power plays, institutions of honor, and inter-tribal shows 
of patriarchal control have put women's position in jeopardy. Tribal laws view marriages as alliances 
between groups; women are pawned into marriages and not allowed to divorce, total obedience to the 
husband and his family is expected, and women are prevented from getting any education. Women are 
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 perceived as the receptacles of honor, hence they stay in the domestic sphere, observe the veil and are 
voiceless. The honor of the family, the tribe, and ultimately the nation is invested in women.  
Moghadam (1997:76) accurately points out that, the issue of womens rights in Afghanistan has 
been historically constrained by (a) the patriarchal nature of gender and social relations deeply 
embedded in traditional communities and (b) the existence of a weak central state, that has been unable 
to implement modernizing programs and goals in the face of tribal feudalism. In addition, as I will 
argue, foreign interference by the British, Soviet Union and the United States of America, dating to the 
1880s, critically impeded social development in Afghanistan. In the following section I will show how 
tribal leaders blocked reform efforts that aimed to separate womens identity from that of her family and 
tribal community, and ultimately any attempts at modernizing the state. 
 
Modern Monarchies 
The birth of modern Afghanistan is attributed to Abdur Rahman Khan who ruled from 1880 to 
1901. He was descended from a line of Pashtuns who largely controlled Afghanistan. Amir Abdur 
Rahman was the first ruler to attempt consolidation of the nation into a centralized state. He ruled with a 
ruthless hand that led to him being termed the Iron Amir. Yet, Abdur Rahman tried to change some 
of the customary laws that were detrimental to women's status. For instance, he abolished the 
custom forcing a woman to marry her deceased husbands next of kin, raised the age of marriage, 
and gave women rights to divorce under specific circumstances. In accordance with Islamic 
tenets, women were given rights to their fathers and husbands property. Even though Abdur 
Rahman considered women subservient to men, he still felt that they were due just treatment. 
(Dupree, 1986) Nancy Hatch Dupree surmises that his liberal wife Bobo Jan may have influenced 
the Amir, pointing out that, In fact, she was the first Afghan queen to appear in public in 
European dress without a veil. She rode horses and trained her maidservants in military exercises. 
She had a keen interest in politics and went on numerous delicate missions to discuss politics 
between contending parties. (1986:12) 
Upon the death of Abdur Rahman, his son Amir Habibullah Khan took over and reigned for 10 
years. Habibullah continued his fathers progressive agenda by putting a ceiling on extravagant marriage 
expenses that often caused poverty in many families. His wives were seen publicly unveiled and in 
western clothes. In 1903, Habibullah established the first college in Afghanistan, Habibiya College, 
employing foreign teachers from India, Turkey and Germany. His other achievements included the 
setting up of the first hospital, the first hydroelectric plant, factories and construction of roads in 
Afghanistan, and improved trade with Russian central Asia and India. (Gregorian 1969; Magnus and 
Naby 1998; Dupree 1973) 
  Habibullahs most important contribution to Afghanistan was the return of Afghan exiles, and 
specifically that of Mahmud Beg Tarzi around the turn of the century. If there is a single person 
responsible for the modernization of Afghanistan in the first two decades of the twenty-first century it 
was Mahmud Beg Tarzi. He returned from Syria to found and edit a modernist-nationalist newspaper, 
the Siraj-ul-Akhbar-i Afghan (the lamp of the news of Afghanistan). Between 1911-1918 he advocated 
modern education and political views critical of western imperialism as well as, in subtle ways, the 
monarchy. (Magnus and Naby, 1998) Educated in Syria and Turkey, Tarzi was strongly influenced by 
modern interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence and by the liberties afforded to women in these 
countries. Convinced of womens abilities to engage in public professions, Tarzi viewed women as 
people who deserved full citizenship; he claimed that educated women were an asset to future 
generations and concluded that Islam did not deny them equal rights. In his newspaper Seraj-ul-Akhbar, 
Tarzi devoted a special section on womens issues entitled Celebrating Women of the World, which 
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 was edited by his wife Asma Tarzi. As Schinasi (1979:36) concludes, no one before Tarzi had 
pronounced such words as liberty, respect for the homeland and religion, union, progress, or 
school.  
 Habibullah, due to Tarzis liberal influence, opened a school for girls with English curriculum 
which tribal leaders and mullahs saw as going against the grain of tradition. Unfortunately, as 
Magnus and Naby (1998:39) points out, the liberalization of the nation through education and 
modernization of even the tiny elite spawned an opposition movement. Education for women, and 
states interference in marriage institutions challenged the power of tribal leaders and their 
patrilineal and patrilocal kinship systems, resulting in Habibullahs assassination in 1919. 
Schinasi (1979:26-27) sums up Habibullahs reign perfectly, Habibullah is sometimes referred 
to as the forgotten king. But it was Habibullah who was keen to maintain Afghanistans position 
on the international as well as on the Muslim scene, but he was unable to control both with the 
same skills.  
 
The First Era of Change 
The assassination of Habibullah placed his son Amanullah on the throne marking the full-
fledged modernization period of Afghanistan, as we will see later. Amanullahs first task was to 
completely liberate Afghanistan from the British. He succeeded by defeating the British in the third and 
final Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. Amanullah was relentless in his attempts to modernize Afghanistan. 
His modernizing agenda included the liberation of women from tribal cultural norms. His enthusiasm 
and persistence in enforcing these changes were heavily influenced by the modernization agenda 
operating in Turkey and his impressions from his travels in Europe.  
In 1923, Amanullah drew up the first constitution, establishing the basis for the formal 
structure of the government and setting up the role of the monarch within the constitutional framework. 
(Magnus and Naby, 1998) Amanullah was also influenced and encouraged by Mahmud Tarzi in his 
endeavors. Tarzi was specifically instrumental in designing and implementing changes pertaining to 
women through his personal example of monogamy, education and employment of female family 
members and their unveiled public appearances. His daughter Soraya later married Amanullah. Another 
daughter of Tarzis married Amanullahs brother. Thus, it is not surprising that Tarzis sophisticated and 
liberal intellectual ideology blossomed and concretely embedded itself in Amanullahs reign.  
Amanullah publicly campaigned against the veil, against polygamy, and encouraged education 
of girls not just in Kabul but also in the countryside. At a public function, Amanullah said that Islam did 
not require women to cover their bodies or wear any special kind of veil. At the conclusion of the 
speech, Queen Soraya tore off her veil in public and the wives of other officials present at the meeting 
followed this example. Throughout her husbands reign, Queen Soraya, wore wide-brimmed hats with a 
diaphanous veil attached to them. (Dupree, 1986) Many women from Amanullahs family publicly 
participated in organizations and went on to become government officials later in life. An example is 
Amanullahs sister, Kobra, who formed the Anjuman-I-Himayat-I-Niswan, (Organization for Womens 
Protection) in the early 1920s. This organization encouraged women to bring their complaints and 
injustices to the organization and to unite to contest the oppressive institutions. Along with her mother, 
Soraya also founded the first magazine for women called Ershad-I-Niswan (Guidance for Women). 
Another sister of Amanullah founded a hospital for women. Women were encouraged to get an 
education and in that attempt 15 young women were sent to Turkey for higher education in 1928. Soraya 
was very instrumental in enforcing change for women and publicly exhorted them to be active 
participants in nation building. In 1926 at the 7th anniversary of Independence, Soraya in a public speech 
delivered said,  
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 It [Independence] belongs to all of us and that is why we celebrate it. Do you think, however, 
that our nation from the outset needs only men to serve it? Women should also take their part as women 
did in the early years of our nation and Islam. From their examples we must learn that we must all 
contribute toward the development of our nation and that this cannot be done without being equipped 
with knowledge. So we should all attempt to acquire as much knowledge as possible, in order that we 
may render our services to society in the manner of the women of early Islam. (Dupree, 1986: 46)  
In 1927-1928 Amanullah and his wife Soraya visited Europe. On this trip they were honored and 
feted. In fact, in 1928 the King and Queen received honorary degrees from Oxford University. (Stewart 
1973) They were very impressed by Europe and also by the changes in Turkey. On their return to 
Afghanistan they tried to implement some of the social and cultural changes they had experienced 
abroad. This was an era when other Muslim nations, like Turkey and Egypt were also on the path to 
modernization. Hence, in Afghanistan, the elite was impressed by such changes and emulated their 
development models. However, the time was not right. Presumably, the British distributed pictures of 
Soraya without a veil, dining with foreign men, and having her hand kissed by the leader of France 
among tribal regions of Afghanistan. (Stewart, 1973) Conservative mullahs and regional leaders took the 
images and details from the royal family's trip to be a flagrant betrayal of Afghan culture, religion and 
honor of women. One can take the circulation of such images from foreign sources as evidence of 
British efforts to destabilize the Afghan monarchy, the first of many international attempts to keep the 
country in political, social and economic turmoil. When the royal family returned, they were met with 
hostility and eventually forced out of office. 
Amanullah tried to consolidate Islam and state policies, but faltered when he tried to impose 
rapid changes pertaining to womens status. Many conservative Afghans in the rural areas felt that the 
reforms were too western for their society and the forced changes were against the doctrines of Islam. 
People in the countryside were unable to comprehend the changes being imposed on them in haste, 
especially since men saw these changes as challenging their familial and tribal authority. Resistance was 
strongest to the abolition of bride price and polygamy, and to the introduction of education for girls. The 
1920s were thus the time that conflicts between the elite modernists and traditionalist tribes began to 
surface. The main bone of contention was the changing status of women. What broke the proverbial 
camel's back for the traditionalists and rural population was the institution in 1924 of the freedom of 
women to choose their own partners and attempts to abolish bride price. Fathers of young women saw 
such progressive laws as a loss of social status, familial control and financial security.  
By 1928, the ethnic tribal leaders in the rural regions grew restless and developed coalitions to 
protest the freedoms women were experiencing in Kabul. It should be pointed out here that in this period 
women in tribal and rural areas outside of Kabul did not receive the benefits of modernization. Tribal 
leaders controlled not only their regions, but through inter-tribal unity, held sway over most of the nation 
in resisting attempts at modernization. The Loya Jirga,4 finally put their foot down when marriage age of 
girls was raised to 18 years and for men to 21 years, and polygamy was abolished. They also opposed 
the education of girls, and by the late 1920s forced Amanullah to reverse some of his policies and 
conform to a more traditional agenda of social change. Schools for girls in Kabul and in rural areas were 
closed down, and women had to revert to wearing the veil. As Moghadam (1997) points out, women 
could not cut their hair, mullahs were given unlimited powers to institute their agendas and the old tribal 
system was to be reinstated. Amanullah even married a second time (for a brief period) to pacify the 
opposition, but it was too late. (Stewart, 1973) Nevertheless, pressures on Amanullah mounted, and in 
1929 he was forced to abdicate and leave the country. Gregorian (1969:243) asserts that, Amanullah, 
determined to improve this situation [the status of women] and maintaining that his support of the 
                                                 
4 A group of tribal leaders and elected officials coming together to democratically arrive at decisions. 
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 feminist cause was based on the true tenets of Islam, took more steps in this direction in his short rule 
than were taken by all his predecessors together. Amanullah was ahead of his time; his liberalism in an 
era when Afghanistan was barely united in a sense of nationhood was traumatic for the state. 
The next two decades saw the Afghan royalty change hands with different families and leaders, 
but not again a leader who would push the reform and women's agenda to the detriment of their rule. 
Following the exile of Amanullah, a series of rulers introduced conflicting laws regarding the status of 
women. From total abrogation of gender equality laws under Amir Habibullah II, a Tajik (who ruled for 
a period of nine months after Amanullah), to Nadir Shah who ousted him, women saw in the 1930s and 
1940s a cautious introduction of rights. In 1931 Nadir Shah announced the second Constitution. He 
opened some schools for girls and tried to bring about some gender-based reforms but was careful to 
avoid conflicts with the mullahs and tribal leaders. Despite his cautionary approach to womens rights, 
Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933 and Zahir Shah came to power.  
 
Post-Monarchy Period 
By mid-century, with massive foreign aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union, 
Afghanistan embarked on a modernizing journey. By the late 1950's, a need was perceived for women to 
be economically active to help Afghanistan achieve its targeted development goals. Women's issues 
were once again given some consideration. The then Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud did not want to 
repeat the haste and mistake of his predecessor Amanullah and declared veiling a voluntary option. By 
now women were expected once again to abandon the veil, marriage expenses were curtailed, and 
women were encouraged to contribute to the economy. The 1940s and 1950s saw women becoming 
nurses, doctors and teachers.  
In 1964 the third Constitution allowed women to enter elected politics and gave them the right to 
vote. The first woman Minister was in the health department, elected to the Parliament along with three 
other women. In 1965 People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Soviet-backed socialist 
organization was formed. The same year also saw the formation of the first women's group, the 
Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW). The main objectives of this women's group was 
to eliminate illiteracy among women, ban forced marriages, and do away with bride price.  
 
The Second Era of Change 
The second era of intense womens reform occurred in the late 1970s. The 1970s saw a rise in 
women's education, faculty in the universities, and representatives in the Parliament. (Dupree, 1986) The 
year 1978 saw the rise to power of the controversial PDPA. It is during the PDPA rule that rapid social 
and economic change, echoing some of the 1920s themes, was implemented and mass literacy for 
women and men of all ages was introduced. (Moghadam, 1997) Massive land reform programs, along 
with abolition of bride price and raising of marriage age were also part of the PDPA agenda. In October 
1978 a decree was issued with the explicit intention of ensuring equal rights for women. Minimum age 
of marriage was set at 16 for girls and 18 years for boys. The content of decree number 7 and the 
coercion of women into education were perceived by some as unbearable interference in domestic life. 
(Hanne, 1990) Again, the revolutionary pace of social change caused concern among the mullahs and 
tribal chiefs in the interiors. They viewed compulsory education, especially for women, as going against 
the grain of tradition, anti-religious and a challenge to male authority. As Moghadam (1997) reports, 
incidents of shooting of women in western clothes, killing of PDPA reformers in the rural areas and 
general harassment of women social workers increased. As Marsden (2002:24) points out, The PDPAs 
use of force in bringing the changes to fruition, combined with a brutal disregard for societal and 
religious sensitivities, resulted in massive backlash from the rural population.  
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 Interestingly, or ironically, during this turbulent democratic Soviet-supported regime women's 
issues moved center stage and implementation of reforms was enforced, up to a point. During this era 
women were employed in significant numbers in Universities, private corporations, the airlines and as 
doctors and nurses. But for the nation as a whole, it was a period of anarchy and destruction. Beginning 
with the Soviet occupation in December 1979, Afghanistan witnessed a decade long war. Fueled by 
external forces, funding, and political interests by the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and 
China, the Mujahideen fought against the Soviets. The Afghan countryside was the breeding grounds for 
these freedom fighters. Suspicious of the Soviet socialist agenda to annihilate the traditional culture 
and religion of Afghanistan, the Mujahideen was able to gather forces to form their own revolutionary 
army. Their battle cry was a war in the name of Islam, emphasizing a reversal of all socialist policies 
including those that guaranteed women liberties through education and employment. 
In 1989, when the Soviets left Afghanistan, the country was in disarray and became the site for 
civil war with the government transfer of power in 1992.That year the Mujahideen took over Kabul and 
declared Afghanistan an Islamic state. According to the US Department of State (1995), In 1992 
women were increasingly precluded from public service. In conservative areas in 1994, many women 
appear in public only if dressed in a complete head-to-toe garment with a mesh covered opening for their 
eyes." This was only to be the start of the apartheid against women. As the author of Zoyas Story 
(2002:63) claimed, Far from rejoicing that the Russians had been defeated, Grandmother told me that a 
new worse Devil had come to my country. There was a popular saying around this time: Rid us of these 
seven donkeys and give us back our cow. The donkeys were the seven factions of the Mujahideen, and 
the cow was the puppet regime [Najibullah who was installed by the Russians before they left]. 
According to Zoya (2002), the Mujahideen entered Kabul and burnt down the university, library and 
schools. Women were forced to wear the burqa and fewer women were visible on television and in 
professional jobs. The period from 1992-1996 saw unprecedented barbarism by the Mujahideen where 
stories of killings, rapes, amputations and other forms of violence were told daily. To avoid rape and 
forced marriages, young women were resorting to suicide.  
Later in 1996, the same consortium (U.S.A., Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia) supported the 
Taliban to counter the mismanaged politics and unexpected brutalities of the Mujahideen. Initially a 
sense of relief was palpable. But it was extremely short lived, and very soon the Taliban set up Amar Bil 
Maroof Wa Nahi An al-Munkar (Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) to 
monitor and control women's behavior. The Taliban made sweeping changes in the social order and used 
the radio to broadcast its new laws (televisions were banned). Daily, Radio Sharia reminded the citizens 
of their duty to the country and Islam, and listed the changes men and women needed to make to 
conform to the new fundamentalist regime. For women, this meant no longer being able to go outside 
except to buy food. If women did leave home they had to be accompanied by a mahram (male relative). 
Women had to wear the burqa and no makeup or fancy shoes. White shoes were forbidden since that 
was the color of the Taliban flag. Women and girls could not go to school nor visit male doctors. Not 
unlike the Mujahideen, the Taliban too indulged in forced marriages and rapes. On the liberation of 
Kabul in November 2001, Zoya (2002:226) states, No one was sorry to see the Taliban defeated, but 
neither did they rejoice when the Northern Alliance [mainly Mujahideens] took over. They too had 
blood on their hands. 
Thus the two so-called progressive eras of the 1920s and 1970s, while attempting to improve 
womens status were not only unsuccessful but also led to violent, fundamentalist backlashes by 
subsequent governments. In both periods, tribal leaders who objected to the redefining of women by the 
state and the diminution of their general authority initiated the disruption of the modernization process. 
These patterns of resistance to change focused on conditions for women suggest that future efforts to 
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 modernize in Afghanistan will only succeed with full recognition of the multiple conflicts, fissures 
and resistances to change. Though the first era saw a despot implement change (undeniably favorable to 
women), the second era saw a socialist-democratic but equally authoritarian regime forcibly impose 
change. As desirable as many of these changes may have been for Afghanistan, in neither situation were 
rural communities of Afghanistan involved. These issues remain important today when once again a 
limited national government and international pressure demand radical changes in womens status. In 
the next section, I explore particular ways that fundamentalist beliefs, especially about womens location 
in the family both limit and provide opportunities for womens involvement in social change. 
 
Women Fundamental to the Family 
Any discussion of women in Afghanistan today must also reflect the shift in global politics 
since the 1980s. Over the past twenty years the spread of Islamic fundamentalism has created a pan-
Islamic culture that exerts itself through state control. This powerful state ideology has been intensified 
by the Western response to 9/11 further strengthening the anti-Western ideology leading to deeper 
Islamization of the Middle East and Asia.5 Given this global situation, combined with the recent 
bankruptcy of left politics in the Middle East and Asia, plus the impoverishment of democratic 
governance, fundamentalism has been further fuelled in the region. 
Fundamentalism is a much-contested term. In recent years, the term fundamentalism in 
recent years has attained a political connotation where it is now defined by the West to 
describe societies that are Islamic.  I make this point because Westerners do not refer to the 
Indian state as being fundamentalist even though it has a right-wing Hindu government in 
power. Therefore, for the West, fundamentalism is not just about states that are not secular, 
liberal and individualistic but also those that are Islamic. 
Ironically fundamentalism (including western Christian fundamentalism), though played out 
differently in culture-specific ways in all belief systems, lays out almost identical proscriptions for all 
women. As Hawley and Proudfoot (1994:4) point out for American Protestants, Family is the natural 
home of religion, women in the family are its pivotal personality and principal guardians. They 
continue, Fundamentalist religion idealizes women, she is the self-sacrificing wife, and mother whose 
hands are little sullied by the business of running the external world. Similar points could be made 
about Islamic fundamentalism. 
Helen Hardacre (1994:118) points out that, Religion as a cultural force in human history has 
been remarkably powerful in establishing long-lasting, influential motifs of gender.Religions invest 
the family with sacred significance, and this extends to gender and interpersonal relations. The family is 
the primary unit for ritual observance as well as an influential site of religious education and the 
transmission of religious knowledge from one generation to the next. To ensure that patriarchy is 
maintained, family is reinforced along gender hierarchies to ensure the transmission of religion, culture 
and family values from mothers to children. Yet idealization does nothing to improve women's material 
states since the concept of motherhood is glorified and not the actual mother. Clarifying and embedding 
gender roles within the family becomes a strategy ensuring power and control of women by men within 
the structures of traditional patriarchy. Threatening this safe haven is projected as destruction of the very 
fabric of society. These cultural symbols ratify fundamentalist rules from women to society in general. 
Despite the apparent increased oppression that women have encountered with the emergence of 
fundamentalism in many Muslim states, many women prefer their lives to westernized women who are 
projected as corrupt, licentious, and anti-family. Hardacre (1993:141) enumerates the following reasons 
                                                 
5 Recent western pressure to attack Iraq and the prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict has further fuelled such 
divisive thinking especially among the youth of Islamic states. 
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 that render religious dictates attractive to women: women, like men, support anti-colonial and pro-
nationalist indigenous regimes; like men, women are fearful of change that weakens kinship ties and 
therefore social and economic dependencies; women want to be morally upright believers; women feel 
that their faith endows them with the will to keep their husbands and children on the path of God; 
women feel a sense of security within the household and outside, and finally fear modernization that 
may confuse and complicate their daily lives through disruption of traditional institutions. Given the 
present conditions of life in Afghanistan, religion may be perceived as the only force able to reinstate a 
sense of nationhood, kinship solidarities, and economic and political empowerment against what are 
seen as corrupting western ideologies and forces 
As a result, women who accept fundamentalism as a way of life do not blame Islam for their 
impoverished and oppressed lives, but blame the corrupt government, patriarchal controls, and distorted 
interpretations of the Quran. At this point I do want to make a distinction between fundamentalism and 
Islam as a religious construct. To put it simply, the former is a political movement and the latter an 
individual and social belief system. Underlying their responses is a sense that the secular West wants to 
destroy Islam. Women in Afghanistan hate the Afghan fundamentalists, not Islam. As Kandiyotti 
(2001:53-54) concludes, one has to understand the links between Islam and cultural nationalism; 
process of state consolidation and the modes of control established over local kin-based, religious and 
ethnic communities; and thirdly, international pressures that influence priorities and policies. The 
intersection of these institutions creates both an oppressive patriarchal order that renders women 
dependent on men through kinship loyalties, and also sustains the cultural conditions in which women 
are willing participants.  
The discussion on women's situation in Afghanistan has once again opened up the debate about 
the West versus the Middle East. Much of the recent debate about women in the Middle East and Islamic 
states has centered on the tension between a western model of citizenship and a model of citizenship 
based on women's continued submergence in family and community. These different models of 
citizenship are ascribed to distinct sociopolitical systems. In the West, the emphasis on liberalism, 
individualism, and secularism has led to citizenship to be defined in masculinist terms that marginalize 
women and any men who do not fit the dominant mode of masculinity. (Joseph and Slyomovics 
(2002:1). In Islamic states citizenship has been rooted in collective identity as proclaimed by the 
religious text. According to interpreters of Islam, individuals function through kinship groups where 
each individual within the group complements the other, thereby strengthening the unity of the group.  
The family lies at the heart of Afghan society. Joseph and Slyomovics (2002:1) argue that, 
religious institutions consider themselves the guardians of family integrity and hold families 
responsible for safeguarding religious sanctity. When the kinship structure is legitimized through 
religion then patriarchy attains a religious status. In many economically underdeveloped societies 
women do not have access to education, employment or property. Although the Quran gives women 
limited rights to their fathers and husbands property, religiously legitimated patriarchy circumscribes 
those rights. Thus, women's economic and political dependence on men is reinforced by this religiously 
based patriarchy. Perceived as the receptacles of family honor, women's complimentary and 
subordinate relationship to men in the family ensures the unity, cooperation and ultimate dignity of the 
family and the community. In this honor also lies her oppression.  
Despite the fact that Joseph and Slyomovics (2002) understand how a patriarchal kinship system 
limits womens identity, they contend that, in opposition to western notions of citizenship, Middle 
Eastern systems provide more room for women to negotiate her role. I disagree with this projection 
because a) it uncritically limits womens roles to those defined by the family, and b) history has shown 
how repressive fundamentalist societies use the institution of family to oppress women. Numerous 
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 researchers on women in the Islamic states justify the differential status of women in contradistinction to 
women in the West by claiming that women in the West have been commodified through advertising, 
marginalized and hegemonized by the Western state. Although commodification occurs in the West, the 
subordinate situation of women in Islamic states is not justified by contrast. In both societies (the West 
and the Middle East) the construction of womanhood through the definition of a heterosexual family and 
state (rooted in religion and/or so-called liberal secularism) provides the basis for women's oppression. 
Thus, in order to start a dialogue about the empowerment of women in any society one must understand 
the family, its impact on the actors within the family, and the effect of replicating familial hierarchies in 
society. 
Yet, such a dichotomy between individual and group is problematic because in all cultures 
(East, West and Middle East) regardless of the model of citizenship, most women, unlike most men, are 
defined through their roles in the family and community. For all women although the family and the 
community may be locales of self-expression and even empowerment, they are also the same institutions 
in which women are oppressed. In all societies, the peculiar way that individual and family, and 
individual and state are linked actually creates the basis of any gender hierarchy. In other words, the 
degree to which an individual can be "free" from the family or social group is one of the features 
defining gender in any social setting. However, this does not imply that the only way women can gain 
equality or empower themselves is to alienate themselves from family and community. In Afghanistan, 
as in other traditional societies, women do not exist outside the family and community. Yet, family and 
kinship networks do not necessarily have to be destroyed in order to improve womens status through 
education, employment and access to resources. But they must be rearranged.  
Defining one's relations in civil society as antithetical or irrelevant to citizenship perpetuates 
the myth that one's specific social connections are politically irrelevant. Feminists must realize that any 
theoretical analysis that proceeds from the polarization of civil society and the state precludes the 
possibility to develop strategies that can address issues of gender hierarchy globally A critique of the 
presumed split between civil society and the state, or between religion or the community, remains 
crucial to the development of a future for women in Afghanistan.  
As we saw in the review of the history of reform movements of the 1920s and 1970s, any 
legislation enhancing womens status by separating her from her family and community not only met 
with resistance from the tribal leaders and community but also led to the overthrow of the political 
regimes sponsoring such legislation. Womens role in the family and community is tied to the 
preservation of patriarchy through the religious submission of women to ideal gender roles. In 
Afghanistan the maintenance of subscribed gender roles enabled men in the family and the community 
to exercise power. Any threat to polygamy, removal of bride price, raising of marriage age, or divorce 
laws was seen as loosening control over women who would then challenge men's authority. Yet, this 
means that women's dependence on men for economic benefits, social recognition and familial 
satisfaction ties them to the family, and ascribes their citizenship through the community. 
While caught in a web of intricate politics and spiraling poverty, women of Afghanistan have to 
redefine their community so that their economic and social contributions to society are recognized. 
Afghan women, as women everywhere are an integral part of their family, community and nation. It 
remains crucial to talk about women in Afghanistan as subjects with a history, conscience, a rationality 
for themselves; in other words, as women involved with the familial, social and economic process hand 
in hand with men. As Sima Wali, one of the few women who attended the Bonn talks on Afghanistan, 
states, Men in Afghanistan are part of the solution not the problem. (2002:5) She takes umbrage with 
American feminists who insist on liberating women from their oppressive men. Therefore, for women 
in Afghanistan (and outside), family remains an institution where not only honor of women but also their 
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 survival is based. It is in the interrelationships of men and women that societal sanctions and 
development is perceived. Given Afghanistans current situation, till political stability and economic 
reconstruction occurs Islam as a state instrument cannot be downplayed either.  
Given this historical background, one has to look at the future with caution. For 
womens status to improve in Afghanistan, the area that is the most vulnerable and needs 
immediate remedying is an emphasis on rural reconstruction. Rural Afghanistan is the 
backbone of Afghan society. In the immediate future, Afghan concerns are economic. Within 
the country thousands of women have been widowed, abandoned, divorced and rendered 
unmarried. These women survive in poverty as single women, or heads of their households. 
Education, skill training, and employment of these women could create a class of women who 
would then be economically empowered. This empowerment could translate into political 
power, which in turn could impact the need to change womens situation in the emerging 
Afghan society. Similarly, given the poverty of people in unfragmented households too, if 
womens education and employment is tied to mens skill acquisition and employment, her 
training can be perceived as enhancing the family income. Education and employment of 
women at the expense of mens will once again be perceived as a western ploy and resisted by 
men. Given the level of poverty and political instability, kinship ties get stronger and provide 
the economic and social comfort against the present situation. Contesting these institutions in a 
formulaic way to empower women is not a viable option. The solution lies in strengthening 
these bonds by insisting on womens economic participation. The expectation of such a 
strategy is that along with legislation, in the long run, educated women will be able to negotiate 
their roles in the family and society through their heightened economic participation. They will 
also be able to sustain a religious, cultural family structure on which both men and women 
depend. 
Unlike earlier times, today in Afghanistan economic reconstruction and the 
maintenance of an Islamic identity are of primary concern to Afghan citizens. A call for 
democracy with Islam as the national religion (but separate from the state) is the language of 
currency. Situational politics demands a hybridized approach to development for the state. In 
this complex process, the first step will be to engage the tribal leaders in a dialogue and power 
sharing over the future of Afghanistan. Disarming warlords and reorganizing of local 
hierarchies will have to be risked. For economic and social change to occur in the countryside, 
local non-government organizations and development bodies should be supported in their use 
of community workers to educate the people bring about economic opportunities. Traditional 
modes of communication through kinship networks can still be mobilized to effect social 
change by creating networks of women. Social change is a product of diffusion, historical 
continuity and local modernity. Islam in Afghanistan is a reality that will inform peoples lives, 




Afghanistan has always had elite and middle-class women who asserted their rights and marched 
towards modernization. But despite these examples, the lot of most Afghan women in rural areas has 
been one of oppression through tribal customs and dictates. Those women who were publicly visible 
throughout the history of Afghanistan belonged to the royalty or elite and represented a very tiny 
population of the country. They do act as role models and provide a window into the possibility that 
social change can occur and illustrate the potential that women from different strata of society can 
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 attempt change in their lives. Magnus and Naby (1998:13) claim that, The internalization of democracy 
based on western individualism rather than traditional Afghan Islamic communalism, gender-blind 
social interaction, and the elevation of the individual above society, does not appear to be part of the 
emerging regional or Afghan worldview. I agree, especially in light of the non-deliverance of rights and 
promised goods by western democracies to their own populations. In Afghanistan, democracy and an 
assertion of womens rights can occur when the state is in an economically and politically stable 
condition, assisted by men and women inside and outside of Afghanistan. Democracy will occur as a 
process of social change that the whole nation needs to undergo. When this happens, a society built on 
democratic-oriented ideology will regard women as equal partners in the social, political, and economic 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. 
Today Afghanistan is in such a desperate state that without external help and financial aid its 
future will be further jeopardized. It is against this political backdrop that one has to understand 
womens situation in Afghanistan. Major dilemmas will always exist as to the most appropriate path to 
follow. There will always be debates about a so-called western model, urban elite model, Islamic model, 
and fundamentalist model. The basic (may I say fundamental) need is to ensure that women, like men, 
have access to resources for survival like education, jobs, mobility and public visibility. They too, like 
men, need to be ascribed status and respect for their decisions.  
At the crossroads of Islamic fundamentalism and westernization, especially in terms of 
womens status, Afghanistan provides the testing grounds for the future of hybridization. The current 
socio-political situation provides a basis for new insights into theoretical constructions of modernity, 
secularism and gender equality. The situation of women in the future of Afghanistan might challenge the 
dominant discourse on citizenship and feminism as defined by the West and provide to non-western 
nations and minorities in western nations an alternative that can bring social justice and economic 
equality to all. For women in Afghanistan participation in the economic reconstruction of the country is 
essential to realize their dreams of a cohesive and peaceful nation; becoming victims of Islamic burqas 
and Western liberation is the least of their concern. 
In Afghanistan, as in other traditional societies, women do not exist outside the family and 
community. Yet, family and kinship networks do not necessarily have to be destroyed in order to 
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